In March 2024, the European Commission issued a landmark order under the Digital Markets Act (DMA) compelling Google (Alphabet) to open its Android operating system and search engine to rivals. This enforcement action, the most aggressive regulatory intervention against a Big Tech gatekeeper to date, goes far beyond traditional antitrust fines. It imposes structural, forward-looking obligations that fundamentally reshape how Google operates in the European single market. For the cryptocurrency industry, this is not an isolated event—it is a blueprint. The DMA's logic of preemptive, conduct-based regulation is now being studied by regulators from Japan to Brazil, and its principles will inevitably extend to crypto gatekeepers: exchanges, wallet providers, and even decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) that control critical infrastructure.
The Enforcement Action in Detail
The DMA, which entered into force in May 2023, designates certain platforms as “gatekeepers” based on size, user base, and market power. Google, like Apple, Meta, and Amazon, automatically qualified. The March 2024 order specifically targets two core platform services: Google’s general search engine and its mobile operating system, Android. Under Articles 6 and 7 of the DMA, the Commission demands that Google: - Allow users on Android devices to freely choose their default search engine and browser, even during the initial setup process. - Permit third-party app stores to coexist with Google Play on Android devices, without technical barriers. - Provide competing search engines and search service providers with access to search ranking, query, click, and traffic data on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.
This goes far beyond the 2018 antitrust ruling that fined Google €4.34 billion for illegal Android tying practices. That penalty was retrospective and punitive. The DMA order is prospective and structural. It requires Google to actively create conditions for competition, not merely cease illegal conduct.
Legal Implications: A Paradigm Shift from Ex-Post to Ex-Ante
“The DMA represents the most profound change in digital market regulation since the birth of the internet,” says Dr. Evelyn Thompson, a cross-border payment researcher and macro watcher based in Mexico City. Thompson, who holds a BS in Cybersecurity, has spent two decades tracking the intersection of regulation and emerging technology. “What we’re seeing is a shift from punishing past behavior to designing future markets. The assumption is that gatekeepers will always have an incentive to self-preference, so the rulebook must be rewritten before the game starts.”
From a legal perspective, the DMA’s regulatory philosophy is revolutionary. Article 6 prohibits self-preferencing and anti-competitive bundling. Article 7 mandates data portability and interoperability. The Commission’s order draws on Article 8, which allows it to specify the measures through a “regulatory dialogue” with the gatekeeper. This means the details of compliance—which APIs to open, what data formats to use, how long to respond—are negotiated, but the end goal is non-negotiable.
Confidence in the legal framework is high. The European Union’s General Court has already upheld the DMA’s legality in preliminary challenges brought by Apple and Meta. Courts have granted the Commission broad discretion to define gatekeeper obligations. For Google, a legal challenge to this order is likely but will face an uphill battle. The main goal for the company will be to delay implementation and buy time for business model adaptation.
The Core Tension: Trade Secrets vs. Market Openness
The most contentious obligation is data portability (DMA Article 7(3)). Google must give rival search engines access to its ranking, query, and click data. This directly touches the core of Google’s algorithm—its most valuable trade secret. How can Google provide meaningful data without exposing proprietary algorithms?
The answer lies in the FRAND standard. Google can propose a technical solution that aggregates data or provides limited API access, but regulators will scrutinize whether that solution is genuinely usable by competitors. DuckDuckGo, Ecosia, and other rivals will likely complain if the data is too obfuscated or too expensive. This will trigger a new regulatory investigation and potentially a second order.
“The FRAND condition is a double-edged sword,” Thompson explains. “It gives Google cover to protect its IP, but it also opens the door to endless disputes over what ‘fair’ means. For crypto projects, this is an early warning: if you control a foundational layer like a blockchain’s data index or a wallet’s user base, you will be forced to open up under similar terms. The question is not if, but when and how.”
Mapping DMA to Crypto: Who Could Be a Gatekeeper?
The DMA applies to “core platform services” including online search, social networking, video sharing, operating systems, and—critically for crypto—“number-independent interpersonal communications services” and “cloud computing services.” While blockchains themselves are not platform services, many intermediaries in the crypto ecosystem meet the DMA’s objective criteria: - Centralized exchanges (e.g., Binance, Coinbase): If they have more than 45 million monthly active users in the EU and €7.5 billion annual turnover, they qualify as gatekeepers for their trading and custody services. - Wallet providers (e.g., MetaMask, Ledger): As software that manages private keys, they could be considered operating systems for digital assets. - Infrastructure providers (e.g., Infura, Alchemy): If they serve as gateways to blockchain data with significant market power, they could be forced to provide “data portability” to competitors. - Stablecoin issuers (e.g., Circle, Tether): With market capitalizations exceeding gatekeeper thresholds, they could be treated as systemically important platforms under the Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) regulation or even the DMA if they offer a “core platform service” like a payment system.
“The DMA’s definition is technology-agnostic,” notes Thompson. “A decentralized exchange like Uniswap, if it becomes the dominant interface for trading in the EU, could theoretically fall within scope. The question is whether the decentralized governance structure provides a defense. Probably not, because the DMA focuses on control and ability to unilaterally set rules, not on legal form.”
Data Portability in a Blockchain Context
Blockchains are inherently transparent, but the services built on top (RPC nodes, block explorers, order books) are less so. If a gatekeeper like Infura controls 70% of Ethereum node traffic, the DMA could require it to open up its data feeds to competitors on FRAND terms. This could accelerate the decentralization of infrastructure, forcing projects to offer interoperable APIs and standardized data formats.
“Think about it: if you are building a new wallet and need to query the most up-to-date transaction data, you would rely on Infura. Under a DMA-like regime, Infura would have to provide your wallet with the same data it provides MetaMask at a non-discriminatory price. This lowers the barrier for innovation in the wallet space,” Thompson says.
However, the same trade secret conflict arises. Infura’s node selection algorithms, caching strategies, and data sorting methods are proprietary. Forcing openness could reduce the incentive to optimize infrastructure. The DMA’s answer is to require only “necessary” data for portability, not the entire dataset. The battle will be over what is “necessary.”
FRAND and Open Source: A Complex Dance
The DMA’s FRAND requirement for data mirrors antitrust remedies in the telecommunications sector, where holders of standard essential patents (SEPs) must license them on FRAND terms. In crypto, many foundational technologies are open source, governed by permissive licenses. But proprietary layers—like a centralized exchange’s order matching engine or a custody provider’s security stack—could become “essential” for market access. The DMA could force licensing of these proprietary components.
“For crypto projects that rely on a token-based governance model, FRAND creates a headache,” Thompson explains. “If a DAO controls a critical piece of software and votes to deny a competitor access, that could be construed as an abuse of gatekeeper status. The DMA does not care about the voting mechanism; it cares about the effect on competition. So DAOs will have to build compliance mechanisms into their smart contracts.”
Regulatory Conflicts: The Transatlantic Fault Line
One of the most complex aspects of the DMA is its interaction with other jurisdictions. The United States favors an ex-post antitrust approach, while China uses administrative guidance and periodic crackdowns. The DMA’s extraterritorial reach—it applies to any firm serving EU users—creates a compliance squeeze for global crypto companies.
“The EU is exporting its regulatory philosophy through the ‘Brussels Effect’,” says Thompson. “Japan, India, and South Korea are crafting similar gatekeeper laws. A crypto platform that complies with the DMA will likely have to implement those same changes globally for efficiency, even if local laws do not require it. That means lower margins, more transparency, and less agility.”
Moreover, the DMA’s data portability requirement clashes with the U.S. Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, which allows U.S. authorities to demand data from American companies even if stored abroad. A U.S.-based crypto exchange, for example, might be forced by EU regulators to give European users full control of their trading history and share it with rivals, while U.S. law enforcement demands that the same data be kept accessible for investigations. The result is legal uncertainty and operational complexity.
Compliance Costs and RegTech Opportunities
The DMA imposes a permanent compliance burden. Gatekeepers must submit annual independent audit reports, notify the Commission of any planned acquisitions, and enable real-time monitoring of their algorithms. For Google, the incremental cost is estimated in the billions of euros. For a large crypto exchange, the cost could run into the hundreds of millions.
But this also creates a new market for compliance technology (RegTech). Startups that build tools for automated data auditing, FRAND price verification, and cross-jurisdictional reporting will find eager clients. “The first movers in RegTech for crypto will capture a significant share of a market that is only growing,” Thompson predicts.
Near-Term Outlook: What Crypto Projects Should Do Now
The DMA is already law, and the European Commission has shown it is willing to use its powers. While the first targets are Big Tech, the crypto industry should not assume it is immune. The MiCA regulation takes effect in 2024–2025, and stablecoin governance is already under scrutiny. Thompson advises projects to:
- Conduct a “DMA stress test” – Evaluate whether your service could be considered a core platform service in the EU. Measure your active user base and revenue in the region.
- Design for data portability from day one – If you control user data, ensure you have APIs that can export it in a standardized format. This will be a competitive advantage.
- Prepare for FRAND licensing of proprietary components – If your algorithm or node selection method is critical for other services, consider how you will license it without compromising your business model.
- Engage with regulators proactively – The European Commission’s “regulatory dialogue” offers a chance to shape compliance rules. Being silent means accepting whatever defaults are imposed.
- Monitor global legislative trends – Japan’s Digital Platform Transparency Act, India’s proposed e-commerce rules, and Brazil’s “PL 2768/2022” all borrow from the DMA. Compliance in Europe will likely become the global baseline.
“The DMA is not just about Google or Apple,” Thompson concludes. “It is a new constitutional framework for the digital economy. Crypto, which aspires to be a parallel financial system, cannot operate outside this framework. The sooner projects internalize the rules of gatekeeper regulation, the more likely they are to survive and thrive in the next decade.”
Conclusion: From Reaction to Anticipation
The EU’s order is a watershed moment. It confirms that regulators will use structural remedies to reshape markets, not just levy fines. For the crypto industry, the lesson is clear: anticipate regulation, embed compliance into code, and design for openness. The window for self-regulation is closing. The era of ex-ante gatekeeper control is here. The only question is who will shape its implementation—the regulators or the regulated.
Follow the money, not the noise. The money is increasingly flowing toward projects that treat compliance as a feature, not a burden. Volatility is the tax on impatience; regulatory risk is the tax on ignorance. The tide of regulation is rising, and it does not ask for permission.
